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Husserlian variation, Bergsonian intuition and 
Peirceian abduction are contrasted as methodological 
responses to the traditional philosophical problem of 
deriving knowledge of universals from singulars. 
Each method implies a correspondingly different 
view of the generation of the variations from which 
knowledge is derived. To make sense of the latter 
differences, and to distinguish the different sorts of 
variation sought by philosophers and scientists, a 
distinction between extensive, intensive, and 
abductive-intensive variation is introduced. The link 
between philosophical method and the generation of 
variation is used to illuminate different philosophical 
conceptions of nature and nature’s relation to 
meaning and sense. 
 
1) The Problem of Method 
Husserl’s method of variation and Bergson’s 
method of intuition in effect address a 
traditional problem of philosophy: that the 
universal the philosopher seeks appears 
distant from the singularity with which the 
philosopher begins.  Husserl’s and 
Bergson’s methods, however, address the 
traditional problem only by radically 
transforming it.  The distance between the 
singular and the universal is no longer 
conceived as a distance toward an entirely 
transcendent target, but as a distance already 
inherent within experience.2  Indeed, for 
Bergson the traditional problem is so much 
transformed that this distance is reversed: 
the issue is no longer rising from the 
singular to the universal, but rather having 
an intuition that descends to a grasp of the 
singular.  Such a grasp involves sense, a 
term of crucial importance for Merleau-
Ponty and Deleuze.  Sense is meaning that 
inheres in or stems from singulars, yet, as 
meaning, sense is general.  Where the 
traditional methodological problem is 
founding a heuristic that would steer an 
autonomous thinker toward distant 
universality, the transformed problem is 
finding an involvement with the field of 
experience, an intuition, that opens the 
philosopher to a sense already within 
experience.  The world and thence nature 
with its sense are thus participant in 
philosophical method.  So we have to ask 
how nature makes such a method possible.  
How is it that nature has a sense?   
Contrasting Husserl’s and Bergson’s 
methods in light of the traditional problem 
not only gives us an insight into Bergsonian 
intuition, it leads to a suggestion about sense 
and nature.  The contrast is framed by the 
theme of variation.  In traditional induction, 
consciousness arrives at universal judgments 
by detecting an invariant property within a 
collection of variant singulars; the singulars 
and their properties are distributed in an 
already established space of variation.  In 
contrast, for Husserl, a universal judgement 
requires variation in which consciousness’s 
generation of overlapping differences 
reconfigures the space of variation from 
within so as to point to a new general sense.  
Induction involves what is here dubbed 
extensive variation, whereas Husserlian 
judgement involves intensive variation, a 
distinction explained in more detail below.  
Intensive variation is key to Husserl’s 
discovery of a sense immanent within the 
flow of consciousness. But so far as 
intensive variation is generated by 
consciousness, it can be prejudiced.  
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty address this 
problem of prejudice, as do some interesting 
new scientific research programs.  
Overcoming such prejudice requires 
abductive-intensive variation, intensive 
variation that is driven by singulars and that 
is inherently productive of new concepts.  
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 This is what we find in Bergsonian intuition.  
The point about abductive-intensive 
variation is approached below by drawing a 
connection between Bergson’s intuition and 
C.S. Peirce’s method of abduction. The 
connection suggests something about nature, 
namely that Bergsonian intuition leads to an 
“abductive” concept of nature, a concept of 
nature as having sense, which concept 
would help in contesting traditional 
scientific reductionism.   
Before plunging in, another word 
about sense, nature and science.  Touch the 
topic of sense, and language will nearly 
always be nigh.  For example, Merleau-
Ponty, in his earlier work, finds sense most 
of all in language.3  In contrast, Bergson 
insists that intuition has a sense, yet this 
sense is betrayed when translated into 
symbols and language.4  The question at 
stake here—does sense require language?—
pulses in a crucial episode of French 
philosophy, the Derrida-Levinas ‘debate’ on 
phenomena.  Levinas is wont to find in 
Husserlian phenomena a living, intuited 
sense, prior to reflection and mediation, a 
position that echoes Bergson’s.5  On the 
contrary, Derrida argues that sense is always 
already a differential phenomenon of 
language.6  Derrida here converges with 
Heidegger’s insistence on the primacy of 
language over intuitively given sense, 
although Derrida’s différance is rather 
different than Heidegger’s language.7  
Beyond these positions, Merleau-Ponty’s 
later work, while influenced by Heidegger, 
discovers a different twist of sense, namely 
sense as indwelling in flesh and natural 
living bodies that manifest flesh.8   
Following Merleau-Ponty, this paper is 
seeking the beginning of a way to the sense 
of nature.  This pursuit is made urgent by 
our current scientific-philosophical situation. 
Husserl insisted that the philosophical 
science of phenomena not be confused with 
the empirical science of nature.9 Experience 
and thinking have an irreducible sense that 
requires special methods and non-
naturalizable concepts.  But recent advances, 
particularly in cognitive and neural science, 
allow science to reject special methods, non-
naturalizable concepts and sense itself.  On 
the contrary, science—at least in its more 
popular manifestations, if that is not too nice 
a qualification—claims an increasingly 
exclusive right to explain experience and 
thinking.  This is not simply another 
indicator of the crisis remarked by Husserl 
in his famous book10, it indicates a problem 
for philosophy itself.  If cognition and 
concepts are naturalizable, then philosophy 
is a natural phenomenon to be explained by 
science, and philosophy, the Kantian queen 
of the sciences, loses her head.  If, on the 
other hand, the queen wishes an audience 
with the scientists—and some scientists 
would wish this too since they still find 
something important in phenomenology and 
philosophy—philosophy would have to 
address its concepts and methods to the 
court of natural science.  In recent 
phenomenology this problem has been 
approached by seeking a way to “naturalize” 
phenomenology.  One way to do so is to 
reduce sense and phenomenological 
concepts to the senseless entities of 
traditional nature. Another possibility, well 
articulated by Renaud Barbaras, is to seek a 
different sort of nature.11  This would be a 
nature with sense.  We are seeking a nature 
with sense, so we put aside questions about 
language, and related questions that belong 
to a different study of Husserl and Bergson.  
We are gleaning insights through Husserl, 
Bergson, and Peirce; light shed on those 
philosophers themselves is important but 
ultimately incidental.  
 
2) The Problem of Finitude 
We can get a bearing on Husserl’s method 
of variation and its significance by seeing 
how it transforms the traditional problem of 
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 philosophical method, which problem stems 
from finitude. How does a singular, finite 
philosopher arrive at knowledge of 
universals?  
Descartes solves the problem by 
discovering mediating terms within rational 
finitude, namely the natural light and the 
existence of God, which serve as a ladder to 
universal truths.  Hume solves the problem 
through the mediating activity of induction, 
which converts a vertical distance toward 
the universal into a horizontal distance 
across singulars—or rather Hume eliminates 
universals as obligatory fictions.  Kant 
shows that experience is cognizable only if 
it is constituted through the mediation of 
categories (and related cognitive structures 
and operations).  In virtue of this ideal 
constitution, we can make claims about 
universals.  But, notoriously, the Kantian 
solution leaves the problem of the 
thing-in-itself, and of ideas that are merely 
regulative. This problem remains because 
we finite beings do not have intellectual 
intuition, because we have to add concepts 
to intuitions, rather than being given 
concepts intuitively.12    
These simplistic sketches of the 
traditional problem let us situate Husserl, for 
in effect Husserl shows how the traditional 
problem is badly put.  First, the traditional 
problem presupposes that the givens of 
experience are singulars.  Even in the 
Kantian position we are given singulars and 
must add concepts to them.  (If intuitions 
were not singulars, then synthesis would not 
be needed and we would have intellectual 
intuitions.) Second, so far as the given is 
merely singular, the traditional solutions 
presuppose either that universals are merely 
nominal (we never really escape singularity 
to a genuine universal), or that knowledge of 
universals already depends on a universal 
transcending of consciousness, either 
outside it or prior to it (we escape the 
singular only in virtue of an already 
transcendent universal).  These errors 
amount to a third, namely presupposing that 
the ingredients of thinking are either 
singular or universal, and not both singular 
and universal.  
These substantive errors stem from a 
deeper methodological error, namely 
making presuppositions about thinking, 
rather than analyzing it.  Instead of 
supposing that the problem is getting from 
singulars to universals, Husserl asks: what is 
really involved in thinking about universals? 
Here a basic Husserlian claim takes on 
immense weight.  In the Cartesian 
Meditations Husserl writes: “Objects exist 
for me, and are for me what they are, only as 
objects of actual and possible 
consciousness” (CM §30, 99)—and 
transcending objects are included in this 
claim.13  In other words, the transcendence 
of universal ideas is a sense immanent 
within consciousness, not a result of 
consciousness crossing a distance to an 
outside.  As he puts it,  “Transcendency in 
every form is an immanent existential 
characteristic, constituted within the ego. … 
If transcendental subjectivity is the universe 
of possible sense, then an outside is 
precisely—nonsense. But even nonsense is 
always a mode of sense and has its 
nonsensicalness within the sphere of 
possible insight.” (CM §41, 117)14 For 
Husserl, the real problem is reconstructing 
transcendent universals as senses immanent 
within consciousness.  
To follow Husserl, let us return to the 
phenomenological reduction, which is what 
leads Husserl to a sense immanent within 
consciousness.  Another result of Husserl’s 
reduction is that experience is shot through, 
top to bottom, with a horizonal structure.  
No object of consciousness, nor any part of 
it, is ever entirely present or finished.  The 
objective sense of a cogitatum is “never 
present to actual consciousness as a finished 
datum; it becomes “clarified” only through 
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 explication of the given horizon and the new 
horizons continuously awakened.  The 
predelineation itself, to be sure, is at all 
times imperfect; yet, with its 
indeterminateness, it has a determinate 
structure.” (CM §19, 82-83)  The basic 
‘unit’ of thinking is neither a universal nor a 
singular, it is not even a unit, but is an 
always incomplete flow. A cogitatum lacks 
the presence, independence and already 
given determinacy that define the traditional 
singular.  The Husserlian cogitatum, the 
basic given of consciousness, already and in 
advance of active synthesis appears as 
encircled by what the traditional position 
would call a universal.  But this universal 
too is no longer traditional, for it is not given 
as complete, perfect, and abstract, it is 
indeterminately determinate and never fully 
present. This is because the universal aspect 
is manifest as an invariance in a flow of 
variations.15   
The natural attitude inclines us to the 
view that thinking is given singular units 
and must scrabble them together as building 
blocks toward something further.  In this 
case, if you are Hume, crossing the distance 
to the universal is building the tower of 
Babel in a Godless world, or if you are 
Descartes or Kant, such construction 
presupposes a transcendental Lego system 
that would already snap blocks together so 
as to expose universal structure.  Husserl’s 
reduction shows that each block is already a 
stretch, a tension between the singular and 
the universal.  Something as seemingly 
singular as a block of Lego already churns 
with universals, for the block is never 
entirely given, and the sense of it as Lego is 
present through a rule foreshadowed in the 
faces it presents.  The face and the rule can 
neither be split from one another nor fused 
together, the terms sustain one another 
through their mutual repulsion.  This 
unsurpassable tension is what Renaud 
Barbaras suggests we call distance.16  The 
distance between the singular and the 
universal is, for Husserl, neither a vertical 
distance toward transcendence nor a 
horizontal distance of induction or 
association, but a horizonal distance at work 
in every flow of experience.  Husserl is not 
the first to discover this sort of distance: the 
flowing tension between the singular and the 
universal is the underlying theme of Hegel’s 
study of consciousness in the first part 
Phenomenology of Spirit, and is the basis of 
Hegel’s turn to desire and life.  Given that 
Hegel’s project is in a sense to show how 
experience as a whole supplies what Kant 
would have called intellectual intuition, it is 
appropriate to observe here that in the 
Husserlian flow of distances, especially 
since it involves Husserl’s other great 
discovery, passive synthesis, we have 
something like a Kantian intellectual 
intuition—a given that arises together with 
its rule.17   
The Husserlian problem is not figuring 
out how thinking ever leaps to universals 
from singulars.  This a false problem since 
every moment of thinking is exemplary of a 
kind of incomplete, mediated universality.  
The problem is reconstructing the sense of 
traditional universals within this structural 
framework.18  To look ahead, in pursuing 
this new problem we will see how Barbaras 
is right to say that Husserl has the wrong 
kind of distance, a distance within 
consciousness rather than a distance within 
life or nature.  Husserl seeks Kantian 
intellectual intuition by freeing 
consciousness from the actual in free 
variation; but this variation can be 
prejudiced; Bergsonian intuition helps 
address this problem by going in the 
opposite direction, by sinking consciousness 
into a distance that arises within singular 
becomings.19  To get to this point we first 
need to study Husserlian variation.  As is 
well known, variation plays a crucial role 
across Husserl’s philosophy, indeed 
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 variation is what allows for the intuition of 
essences (Wesensschau) and thence for 
eidetic reduction; yet variation is such a 
pervasive theme that it rarely gets central 
treatment as a problem.20  So rather than 
beating the thickets of the Husserlian corpus 
we will strike at the core of variation by 
drawing on passages in Formal and 
Transcendental Logic (FTL21), and in the 
Husserl authorized manuscript Experience 
and Judgement (EJ22), compiled by 
Landgrebe, passages in the midst of 
relatively extended discussions of variation.   
 
3) Variation 
In George Cukor’s film Gaslight (1944), the 
exceptionally malicious Gregory 
manipulates his wife Paula into believing 
she has lost things she has not lost and 
hidden things she has not hidden. At night 
Gregory secretly forages in the attic for the 
jewels of Paula’s murdered aunt; this dims 
the gaslight in the house and fills it with 
ghostly footsteps, effects unnoticed by 
Paula’s aging or insouciant maids.  Paula, 
cut off from society, lacking confirmation 
that lights are really dimming, and so on, 
believes she is going mad. At the turning 
point, Paula, played by Ingrid Bergman, 
finally confronted with Gregory’s perfidy, 
realizes that these events have not been 
madness but deception.  Marvellously, she 
conveys her judgement to Gregory by 
playing its opposite, by pretending she is 
mad and that the knife she has just found, 
which could free Gregory from the ropes 
that bind him, is a hallucination. She says:   
Are you suggesting this is a knife I hold 
in my hand? Have you gone mad, my 
husband, or is it I who am mad? Yes of 
course, that’s it, I am mad, I am always 
losing things and hiding things, and I can 
never find them, I don’t know where I put 
them. That was a knife, wasn’t it, and I 
have lost it, and I must look for it…23
In pretending to search for the ‘lost’ knife, 
Paula uncovers more evidence of deceit, 
namely the lost and hidden things that 
Gregory has secreted in a drawer, which 
further confirm her judgement.   
This scenario nicely illustrates a 
crucial point in Husserl’s account of 
judgements of generality.  It is not as if 
Paula already had before her a set of 
instances S, S’, S’’ that each already have 
the property p, deceit, neatly attached. In 
that case we would have to ask why she has 
not noticed that the property deceit is 
already there in all the instances (or in even 
one of them); and her judgement would 
amount to the statistical claim: “Hey, all 
these S’s have property p.”  Rather, her 
judgement arrives at something new.  Her 
judgement is the discovery both that each 
household incident has been a case of deceit, 
and that the deceit and its motive is one and 
the same in all the instances; she discovers 
the one by way of the other, the property in 
the instances by the sameness of deceit and 
motive through variations, and vice versa. 
According to Husserl, all cases of general 
judgement arrive at something new.  
Suppose we are already given an S that is p 
and an S’ that is p’, etc.; and suppose it is 
also given that the S’s are like one another, 
and the p’s are like one another.  We can 
judge that these S’s that are like all have the 
like property p.  But according to Husserl, in 
this judgement p still designates individual 
moments belonging to each S is p.  It is still 
not a judgement in which p designates a 
universal. (“The judgment S is p in which p 
designates the individual moment in the 
individual object S is completely different 
from the judgement S is p in which p 
designates the universal, the eidos…” (EJ 
§81, 325, 390.))24  Universal judgement 
requires something more, says Husserl, 
namely a judgement that p is one and the 
same everywhere.  This, Husserl says, 
requires a new form of judging, a “new 
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 core” of generality that modifies the form of 
synthesis found in individual moments such 
as “S is p,” by pointing to the individual 
moments as a new kind of complex.   
In terms of Gaslight, Paula’s 
judgement is special because she discovers 
the general property of deceit, which had not 
yet been apparent, through an act that must 
at the same time discover the cases as 
belonging to a new kind of variational 
complex that points to the general property.  
Put otherwise, for Paula, the cases have not 
the slightest tinge of deceit until they, of a 
sudden, point to deceit as that which brings 
them together in a variational complex, until 
the cases newly illuminate a general form of 
deceit that in turn illuminate deceit within 
the cases. Paula’s shift from judging herself 
mad to judging that she has been deceived is 
rather like a Gestalt shift in which what had 
previously appeared as a rabbit now appears 
as a duck.  This is key to the film: we are not 
watching someone statistically accumulating 
evidence already available but are rather 
immersed in Paula’s struggle to reshape her 
overall world view in face of an evil 
manipulator.  (In the first version of the film 
(1940, directed by Thorold Dickinson), we 
are instead placed in an omniscient 
perspective. The film is hardly worth 
watching and one is amazed that the 1940 
makers did not realize that the later 
treatment is what is wanted.)   
Husserl’s profound point, as noted 
above, is that all cases of general judgement 
as it were discover something new, namely 
the sense of the property as a general (or 
universal).25 Returning to Paula’s 
judgement, we can explore the formal 
modification involved in discovering this 
sense.  In running through varying instances 
of her experience, Paula notices a 
““coincidence in conflict”,” (““Deckung im 
Widerstreit”” FTL §98, 219) something 
common across different cases, something 
that, to engage Husserl’s double ray 
metaphor, at once lights up the instances and 
is lit up by them.  She notices “the invariant, 
the indissolubly identical in the different and 
ever-again different” instances; and this 
invariant is “the universal essence” by which 
the variants are restricted (FTL §98, 218).26  
Husserl claims that any constituted 
objectivity “points back, according to its 
essential sort…to a correlative essential 
form of manifold, actual and possible 
intentionality…which is constitutive for that 
objectivity.”  (FTL §98, 217) The sense of 
the universal is a particular case of this 
pointing-back structure; its essential form 
involves invariance in variation, a style 
manifest in variation.  While the universal is 
not part of the varying instances, it is 
inseparable from them, since the invariant 
appears only in relation to the variation.27   
Notice here how the traditional view is 
being challenged.  The natural attitude takes 
grammar, predicate logic, etc., as given, 
which inclines us to think that judging “the 
rose is red” amounts to coupling a general 
property, redness, to this singular rose.  On 
this traditional view we are given a plurality 
of roses that each have a property that in 
each instance already has a general 
structure; the problem of generals and 
universals is how we detach or abstract that 
general property. Husserl transforms the 
problem by suspending the natural attitude 
and asking how we ever come to deploy 
“red” as a general in the first place—and 
here he insists that this requires the creation 
of a new core of generality, much as Paula’s 
judgement in Gaslight involves a 
discovery.28  More, this creation is bound to 
a field of variation. In a word, for Husserl 
universals are not beyond consciousness but 
are immanent in its flow.  Universals are 
manifest as an invariant constraint within a 
performance of variation.29   
Bergson’s contrast between the 
extensive and the intensive helps draw out 
an important point from Husserl’s account.  
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 In the traditional view, induction and the 
formation of general concepts involves what 
is here called extensive variation.  The 
varying instances are taken as given whole 
and entire, one outside the other, within an 
already extant space of variation, and thus 
are an extensive multiplicity.  Induction or 
concept formation amounts to a statistical 
abstraction of or quantification or 
association over elements already given in 
the instances.  On Husserl’s view, 
judgements of generality involve what is 
here called intensive variation.  The 
instances are not laid out in a space of 
variation that already contains the universal 
property that the instances are judged to 
possess; instead, the differential overlapping 
of instances reconfigures their overall 
variational relation so as to point to a new 
sort of unity itself created by the variational 
overlapping, and without this intensive 
Gestalt shift there would be no new core of 
generality.  To put it another way, the work 
of scientific or forensic discovery is not so 
much totting up regularities in an existing 
space of extensive variation, it is seeing 
existing variations as knitting together a 
space with a novel intensive structure.  
Darwin’s genius is not so much extracting 
evidence from an existing data set that 
encompasses geology, earthworm activity, 
pigeon breeding, and so on; his genius is 
first of all seeing this motley as a unified 
space of variation from which we can learn 
something about the origin of species.30   
Our contrast between intensive and 
extensive variation invites spatial-
mathematical concepts invoked by Delanda 
in his recent work on Deleuze, Intensive 
Science and Virtual Philosophy.31 Where 
extensive variation points to a commonality 
that could already be located in the space of 
extensive variation, intensive variation is a 
dynamic complex that curves the space of 
variation from within, giving it a new 
metric, which is cognate to what Husserl 
calls a restriction within variation specifying 
a new general core.    
Taking this classification of variation 
back to Husserl, the difference between 
levels of generality, from empirical 
generalities to genuinely eidetic universals, 
has to do with the kind of intensive variation 
involved.  Consider a block of Lego. It is a 
singular thing, but its horizon lays out a field 
of variation, and the rule that restricts this 
variation is already a template for an 
universal.  But the horizon of variation is 
passively given, and therein lies the Lego-
block’s tendency to the singular.  Contrast 
this with Paula’s judgement, or scientific 
induction.  Consciousness gathers together 
and runs through an increasing plurality of 
singulars, thus creating an increasingly 
variable field that is knit together by an 
intensive variation, and the internal 
restriction on this variation holds the cases 
together in a complex.  And so we move 
from a finite empirical generality, to a 
comprehensive empirical generality.  Eidetic 
universals are arrived at by freeing variation 
from the actual, in a free play that starts 
from an example in order to range over all 
possibility.32    
Descartes’s cogito serves as an 
example.  Gaslight is of course a critique of 
Cartesianism, for it is neither an infinite God 
nor solipsistic reflection that helps Paula 
escape her malicious deceiver, but an other 
person, namely a detective played by the 
nicely finite Joseph Cotten.  But consider 
Paula’s judgement that these empirical 
variations of experience have all been 
deceptive.  Descartes’s meditations precisely 
start from a generality of this sort.  This 
serves as an example that leads to further 
variation, using imagination to free 
Descartes from the actual, pushing the field 
of variation even further, eventually 
replacing a finite deceiver like Gregory with 
an invented all-powerful malicious deceiver, 
which invention adds even more variation to 
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 the field.  And then in this free field of 
variation Descartes finds “the invariant, the 
indissolubly identical in the different and 
ever-again different” variations, “the 
universal essence by which all “imaginable” 
variants of the example, and all variants of 
any such variant are restricted” (FTL §98, 
219)—namely the cogito.  The cogito points 
back to a field of free variation that 
encompasses all possible variants, and thus 
we arrive at a universal eidos proper.33    
In sum, for Husserl ideas are neither 
the result of consciousness contacting a self-
standing universal that entirely transcends 
consciousness, nor of adding an exotic 
ingredient to consciousness.  They are the 
amplification, by the work of free conscious 
variation, of a fundamental structure of 
consciousness.   
Husserlian variation thus abandons 
traditional universals in pursuit of something 
the structure of which is much more like 
what Hegel, in the Science of Logic, would 
call concept.34 Briefly, Hegel contrasts 
concept with essence.  One way to put the 
contrast is that the content specified by an 
essence is (supposedly) detached from the 
singularity of a thing, whereas the content of 
a concept is specified only by grasping it 
through singularity. In its least complex 
form, an essence is imposed on a thing by 
our reflecting identifications; essence is thus 
detached from the thing.  But in thinking 
this way, we implicitly attach a thing to the 
essence that it reflects, and so we are led to a 
more complex form of essence, in which 
essence is taken as internal to the thing.  We 
take the thing itself as doubled, as reflecting 
upon itself; we do so by distinguishing the 
appearance of the thing from the essence of 
which it is the appearance, or in a more 
complex stance we construe the thing’s 
present appearance as actualizing what 
essentially has been and will be possible.  
Either way, for essentialism, singular 
variations are mere appearance.  So 
essentialism tends to detach the visible 
singular from the invisible universal that it 
reflects—even as essentialism appeals to 
increasingly complex forms of attachment 
between thing and essence, visible and 
invisible.   
Hegel shows how the contradiction of 
essentialism transforms into a demand for 
conceptual thinking, in which the content of 
the concept is inseparable from a process 
intrinsic to what the concept is about.  To 
illustrate: When Paula judges that Gregory 
has been deceiving her, her criterion is not 
the conformity of singular household 
happenings to an already specified universal 
essence of deceit; her judgement must first 
of all grasp singular happenings as a process 
the very happening of which institutes a 
uniquely ‘Gregorian’ pattern of deceit, 
which pattern then serves as the conceptual 
criterion of her judgement. As when a 
professor twigs to a plagiarised passage in 
an essay, the crucial thing is not judging the 
unfolding phenomenon against an already 
existing universal standard, it is grasping 
that unfolding as instituting its own 
standard; the passage stands out as 
plagiarised when grasped as not fitting with 
the unfolding essay’s concept of itself.  
Essentialism has a problem grasping such 
Gestalt shifts, or discoveries that resolve the 
Meno paradox, for according to 
essentialism, each thing either is or is not 
essentially X, which leaves no room for an 
X that itself unfolds its criterion, a visible 
that has its own invisible.35  Put in terms of 
the above, Hegelian concepts let us grasp 
universals through a sort of internal 
curvature within the field of variation—as 
opposed to essences that impose universals 
on the field of variation from the outside.  
Concepts are a structural feature of the 
processual field of singular variation. (Since 
this field runs through all variations, for 
Hegel in the end there is one concept 
generative of all concepts.)  
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 Hegel may seem a detour.  But what 
we approach below is not unrelated to 
Deleuze’s theme of concept creation,36 and 
as mentioned at the outset we are also 
stalking the theme of sense.  Both Merleau-
Ponty and Deleuze learn from Hyppolite, 
and in Logique et existence (Hyppolite’s 
study of Hegel’s Logic), Hyppolite translates 
Hegel’s “concept” as “sense [sens]”.  Likely 
this has some impact on the theme of sense 
in Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze,37 and on 
Deleuze’s theme of concept creation. More 
important, the points drawn from Hegel help 
us venture a broad formula for sense, one 
that anticipates the points about sense that 
follow.  With Husserlian variation we are no 
longer pursuing transcendent universals, but 
concepts, structures of processual fields of 
singular variation.  Ultimately, for Hegel, 
conceptual structure would have to be 
generated from within the field of singular 
variations itself, else the reflective logic of 
essentialism would sneak back in.  When we 
grasp concepts as generated by singulars, or 
when our grasp of the world of singulars 
itself presses us to new concepts, we 
encounter sense.38   
To illustrate: Grammar is not a 
universal essence fixed in advance of the 
usage of singular terms, nor are singular 
terms fixed in advance of and opposed to 
grammar.  A native speaker of a language 
neither learns grammar in advance of words 
nor words in advance of usage and grammar, 
but learns both through each other, gaining 
an ever more comprehensive grasp of the 
web of syntax and semantics39 that defines 
the language. Similarly, the chess player 
gains what Bergson calls a “dynamic 
schema” of chess through long play in 
which general rules and singular situations 
are deeply entangled.40  Very often native 
speakers or chess savants cannot formulate 
the universal rules, but they certainly have a 
sense for the language or the game, a sense 
of how words and pieces fit together in good 
or bad plays that make sense or do not.  
Sense is there in the language or the game, 
not in transcendent universals. 
Our next task is to see how Husserl’s 
method of variation falls short of sense.  
 
3) The Problem of Prejudice 
The Husserlian position immediately runs 
into a problem of prejudice: generality is 
reached through the variational work of 
consciousness, but when consciousness frees 
itself of the actual, how does it proceed, 
might it not be going on prejudice?  The 
problem is approached here by noting how 
Husserl’s theme of variation appears in, yet 
is challenged by, recent science and 
Husserl’s phenomenological successors.  
Science obviously depends on 
variation, for the first step in experiment is 
the production or collection of a field of 
varying instances that will serve as the basis 
for some general conclusion.  The 
methodological problems that immediately 
arise are twofold: 1) How to produce a field 
of variation—collect examples, or generate 
variants on an example—that can stand as 
exemplary for a general conclusion.  This 
problem is addressed by procedures of 
experimental design (control groups, etc.) or 
data collection (random sampling, etc.) 2) 
How to conceptualize the field of variable 
instances as a unitary whole that can serve 
as the basis of a general conclusion.  This 
problem is addressed by (a) theories of 
measurement that order instances in an 
already unified space of variation; (b) 
statistical theories that aggregate a plurality 
of instances in such a space.  In recent 
science, though, the usual methods of 
producing and conceptualizing variation are 
being challenged.  Two examples: 
Robert Full and Claire Farley, who 
study animal locomotion, realize that “direct 
experimental perturbations pushed too far in 
search of significant difference” disrupt the 
“finely integrated system[s]” they are 
studying.41  Full and Farley, like Merleau-
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 Ponty, Kurt Goldstein and J.J. Gibson, 
realize that experimental variations in the 
lab give insights into invariants of an 
artificially perturbed organism in an 
artificial environment.  But Full and Farley 
want insights into “functional properties that 
emerge only when they interact with one 
another and the [natural] environment.”42  
Yet scientific generalization requires a field 
of variation.  The problem is how to get one 
that is not an artefact.  Instead of putting 
animals into artificial frameworks of 
experimental variation, Full and Farley look 
to evolution as generating variation. 
Evolution in effect designs “natural 
experiments,” by producing a space of 
variant legs, e.g., the rather different sorts of 
legs that we find in humans, dogs, lizards, 
cockroaches and crabs.  By taking this space 
of intensive variation as their field, Full and 
Farley gain insight into the way all Earthly 
legs work.   
The second example comes from a 
psychologist who takes a dynamic systems 
theory approach to her investigations, Esther 
Thelen.43  In a way, Thelen’s investigation 
repeats Full and Farley’s methodological 
point, but on an accelerated time scale.  If 
you want to give a proper account of 
something like the development of reaching 
in infants, do not try to organize the field of 
variation according to a pre-established 
extensive space of measurement, or by 
grouping infants in pre-established stages of 
development, or by taking the field of 
varying infant behaviour as a topic for 
statistical aggregation.  Instead: Study the 
evolving behaviours of individual infants in 
cases of reaching. Notice how the problem 
of reaching for things collapses extensive 
spaces of variation into new internal patterns 
(conceived as attractors); track differences 
in these attractors in multiple instances of an 
individual infant of reaching, and then track 
the same infant longitudinally through 
development.  Only then compare across 
different infants.  The upshot is that 
Thelen’s conclusion points back to a 
variational field that infants themselves have 
generated, which leads to better insights 
than what happens when you put infants 
through the paces of a pre-established field 
of variation.  
In both these cases experimenters turn 
to a field of intensive variation, since 
evolution and developing infant movement 
are conceiving as building up variational 
possibilities, rather than occupying points in 
an already extant space of variation.  But the 
principle of intensive variation is not 
generated by the conscious activity of the 
experimenter, as in Husserl’s variation, it is 
generated by the world.  And seeking to 
grasp this intensive variation within the 
world presses the experimenter to new 
organizing concepts.  This sort of intensive 
variation, in which intensive variation is 
inherently generative of new concepts, is 
here called abductive-intensive variation. 
The discussion of Peirce in the final section 
of the paper will give the reasons for this 
name.   
The difference between intensive 
variation and abductive-intensive variation 
is crucial to the difference between Husserl 
and his phenomenological successors.  
Heidegger repeatedly criticises Husserl for 
failing to raise the question of existence.  
This cannot really be disentangled from a 
methodological criticism: Husserl’s quest 
for essences is insulated within conscious 
variation, without ever getting down to the 
variational field of existence.  Where 
Husserl conceptually delineates structures of 
experience through the free variation of 
consciousness, Heidegger asks us to imagine 
hammers breaking.  Where Husserl uses free 
variation to arrive at the eidos of 
intentionality, Heidegger reconceives 
intentionality by having us subside into 
angst and boredom, variations that 
spontaneously seize us within the flow of 
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 existence.  Where Husserl traces invariant 
structures within all possible imaginings of a 
phenomenon, Heidegger opens us to 
existence by having us attend to variational 
perturbations that spontaneously arise in the 
flow of existence in advance of 
philosophical reflection.  In this way 
Heidegger aims to free us from the 
conceptual prejudices of the tradition.44
So too with Merleau-Ponty.  
Phenomenology, says Merleau-Ponty, wants 
insight into essences within existence.  What 
is required for this is a slackening of the 
intentional threads, a spontaneous variation 
that exposes us to something beyond our 
everyday prejudiced view.45  Thus Merleau-
Ponty turns for insight to illnesses, illusions, 
or to the dialectical unmasking of bad 
assumptions about experience, which 
unmasking points us to previously unnoticed 
variational structures within experience.  
The insight we gain is not into universals 
beyond us, but to a sense already immanent 
within experience.  
In short, for Husserl, the analysis of 
universals amounts to reconstructing already 
accepted universals, by an act of free 
conscious variation.  But substantive and 
methodological problems encountered by 
the above scientists and philosophers turn 
them to a field of variation that is not 
generated by consciousness, or from the 
internal constraints of consciousness.  And 
this field involves a new sort of variation: 
abductive-intensive variation, a radical 
variation in which production of variation is 
inherently productive of new concepts that 
comprehend the field of variation—in which 
variation exposes a sense already immanent 
within the field.   
We began with a traditional problem 
of philosophy: how can a philosopher arrive 
at universality, beginning from singularity?  
The point of the above is to show that the 
philosopher is rather seeking sense, and the 
path to sense is complicit with a varying 
existence, a nature, that itself presses the 
philosopher to new concepts.  In other 
words, it is not possible to do philosophy 
without doing a philosophy of nature.  We 
have thus arrived at a version of Barbaras’s 
criticism of Husserl, namely that Husserl is 
missing the way that life is generative of the 
distance between singulars and universals.  
And so we now turn to Bergson as a 
philosopher who holds that “theory of 
knowledge and theory of life seem to us 
inseparable,” as he puts it in the beginning 
of Creative Evolution.46  Having put 
Bergson in context of a perennial and 
ongoing philosophical and scientific 
problem brought out through Husserl’s 
concept of variation, we are now prepared to 
see how Bergson’s intuition responds to this 
problem, and how the response arises in the 
link between knowledge and life.  
 
4) Intuition 
Like Husserlian variation, Bergson’s method 
of intuition so permeates his philosophy that 
it seeps up everywhere.  One of the sharper 
discussions is found in the opening of the 
fourth chapter of Matter and Memory, in the 
famous passage about the turn of 
experience.  According to Bergson, pure 
intuition, what is given us in inner or outer 
experience, is an undivided continuity. But 
our practical interests tend to break up this 
continuity into elements laid out side by 
side.  Beginning with this fractionated field, 
empiricism and dogmatic rationalism set 
themselves the task of reconstructing the 
bonds that holds things together.  Because 
the initial fractionation is driven by practical 
concerns, rather than following the internal 
lines of things, the traditional philosophical 
enterprise is doomed.  Bergson writes: 
…we start from what we take to be 
experience, we attempt various possible 
arrangements of the fragments which 
apparently compose it, and when at last 
we feel bound to acknowledge the 
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 fragility of every edifice that we have 
built, we end by giving up all effort to 
build. But there is a last enterprise that 
might be undertaken. It would be to seek 
experience at its source, or rather above 
that decisive turn where, taking a bias in 
the direction of our utility, it becomes 
properly human experience. (MM 184) 
The last enterprise is the method of intuition.  
The context we have been building lets us 
remark several things about it right away. 
First, what we are seeking, concepts that let 
us make sense of articulations of a 
continuity, are not found by contacting a 
transcendent beyond, or by adding a magic 
dash of universals to experience; what we 
are seeking is within experience, but at its 
source, past our usual fragmentation of it.  
We are seeking sense. Second, seeking sense 
within a continuous experience means 
finding coherent cores in an intensive rather 
than an extensive variation.  Third, the sense 
we are seeking will overturn existing 
conceptual prejudices and lead to new 
concepts, and so will involve abductive-
intensive variation.  Fourth, in the sentence 
immediately following the ones just quoted, 
Bergson notes that what Kant has 
demonstrated is the impotence of 
speculative reason.  Bergson, like Hegel, is 
not satisfied with this impotence.  Bergson 
attributes it to service to practical 
necessities, whereas for Kant, as noted 
above, this impotence is due to the fact that 
speculative reason is not intellectual 
intuition.  By freeing reason from utility and 
by thus moving beyond the turn of 
experience, Bergsonian intuition seeks 
precisely what Kant would have called 
intellectual intuition: an intuitively given 
experience that already contains the 
concepts that make sense of it.  This sort of 
concept, as suggested, will grasp a structure 
of invariance within an intensively variant 
experiential continuity.  So far as this 
concept is generated by the given, it is sense.  
Sense is nature as intellectual intuition.   
The remaining problem is: What is the 
method of intuition? How is it possible? 
How is it that concepts are generated and 
exposed within the flow of experience?  
How is it that nature has a sense, that there 
is an intuition within nature?  The passage I 
have cited, and complementary sorts of 
passages, e.g., in chapter one of Creative 
Evolution, or in the lecture “Philosophical 
Intuition,” are somewhat curious as 
statements of method, because they really 
amount to metaphysical claims that at once 
motivate the method and result from the 
method.  Not that this circularity is a 
disaster, rather it is a sign of real 
philosophical thinking, it is the sort of circle 
that we find in those spots where Plato or 
Kant, Aristotle or Hegel set out their 
method.  More, these passages do not give 
an algorithm for having intuition—but on 
the other hand the very thing that intuition is 
rules out an algorithm.  Still, we need a 
methodological indication of what intuition 
is like.  
So we now dip into the very beginning 
of Matter and Memory, where it is widely 
agreed that Bergson takes up the method of 
intuition.  There Bergson asks us to give up 
our traditional empiricist-rationalist 
distinctions between sensations and ideas, 
etc., and to return to the field of experience.  
Doing so, we intuit a flow of images; images 
are at once sensuous and sensible, i.e., 
intelligible.  But this variable flux of images 
is not indeterminate, invariant patterns stand 
out.  The most important invariant is what 
we call our body.  In intuition the body 
stands out in a new way: where we find an 
invariant centre of indeterminate action 
within the image system, there we find a 
body.  Bergson thus arrives at a new and 
important concept of the body.  The body as 
centre of action is not a block of well hinged 
matter given in advance of interaction, not a 
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 terminus of input action that then sends 
output to the outside.  Intuition shows us 
that action is always interaction, a circle 
between interactants.  A living body is that 
material locus in which circles of interaction 
intersect in a nexus complex enough to 
afford indeterminate action and yet persist.  
Bergson’s concept of body not only 
anticipates Merleau-Ponty’s insights, but 
also current efforts to think of bodies as 
dynamic or autopoietic systems.   
The example from Matter and Memory 
illustrates how intuition leads to new 
concepts: the invariant dynamic that we call 
body follows the internal line of things, thus 
marking a concept that points to a field of 
variation given in advance of the bias of 
utility.  This concept is what Bergson, as 
noted above, might call a “dynamic 
schema.”   
Two important points emerge.  First, 
for intuition to yield concepts, we must, as 
Bergson famously put it with the example of 
sugar dissolving, wait.  We must wait for the 
field of variation to expose an invariant that 
gives us an intuitive encounter with a 
concept.  Both Husserl and Bergson view 
concepts as melodic invariants of intensive 
variations of intuition, but Husserl has us 
grasp these by having consciousness whistle 
its own tune until it hits restrictions in the 
whistling.  Bergson instead has us tune into 
an intuitively given melodics of becoming.  
Husserlian concepts are given in the time of 
free variation, Bergsonian concepts are 
given in the duration-variation of things 
themselves.  And so we are led to a 
complication in the concept of invariance: at 
the ideal level, Husserlian invariants become 
static, whereas Bergsonian invariants are 
always varying. This point resonates with 
the current scientific concept of attractors, 
and with conceptual analysis of invariants as 
manifest in variation.  It also affords another 
way of defining sense: where we have to 
wait for concepts, where concept formation 
plunges us into a time beyond us, there we 
find sense. 
Second, the body as conceived in 
Matter and Memory is what enables 
Bergson’s account of intuition.  That is, if 
we ask how Bergsonian intuition is possible, 
we will have to discuss the body as opening 
us to a field of variation in which the body 
stands as an invariant yet indeterminate 
centre of action.  The practical demands of 
the body evolving and living require that the 
body artificially cut up the world in a way 
that prejudices experience; yet the body as 
invariant is not independent of the variation 
in which it lives and moves and has its 
being.  The body is tuned to the variational 
continuity of experience, by contracting the 
duration-variation of things into an intuited 
duration.  So the distance linking singulars 
and universals is opened by life—this 
distance is the body—contra Husserl’s 
failure to see this, as Barbaras notes.  The 
body, then, is tremendously ambiguous in 
Bergson’s philosophy,47 it is the requisite 
link between the theory of knowledge and 
the theory of life, which link and its 
ramifications make Bergson’s method of 
intuition possible. The body not only has 
sense, it is our opening onto sense. Indeed 
the body is our opening onto the sense of the 
body; in intuition we use our bodies to grasp 
the concept of the body, and the dynamic 
schema through which we thinkers conceive 
the body is that very schema which is the 
body; the lines of thinking follow the lines 
of the body. The body is—for us—the first 
sense of nature, it grants what Kant would 
have called intellectual intuition.  
And so Bergson needs to write 
Creative Evolution, for it is evolution as 
creative that makes possible a body open to 
a field of intuitive variation that itself has a 
creative sense.  But rather than following 
Bergson down this path (or is it up this 
path?), let us once again have him activate 
some thoughts worth thinking again, namely 
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Concepts are neither a novel ingredient of 
thinking nor consciousness’s contact with a 
beyond, they are invariants within variant 
thinking, they are, in a word, a kind of 
process of thinking.  But concepts are not 
fixed cognitive ingredients of a process. 
They are process through and through.  
Concepts are a kind of reasoning process.   
For Husserl this reasoning process 
requires variation, and in Experience and 
Judgement he distinguishes variation from 
alteration.  Alteration already possesses an 
essence for something given, and 
maintaining its identity, alters it.  In contrast, 
variation involves differential leaps from 
one singular to another so as to manifest the 
kind of  “coincidence in conflict” that first 
exposes the intensive variational field in 
which an essence can appear.  Variation and 
alteration (Variation und Veränderung) are 
different sorts of difference. (EJ §87.f, 347, 
419)48  (Derrida’s différance is perhaps 
another name for Husserlian variation.)  
Bergson’s intuition involves yet a different 
kind of difference. As is well known, 
Deleuze will come to call this repetition. If 
the field of variation given in intuition is 
intensive, if the field cannot be fractionated 
into “elements laid side by side,” if the 
variation of intuition involves the sort of 
becoming that Bergson discusses in the 
“Possible and the Real” and in chapter four 
of Matter and Memory, then elements and 
moments of this field cannot be understood 
as organized in an already established space 
of variation. The elements and moments 
instead are singularities utterly different than 
one another in their happening.  They 
exhibit a pattern and invariance in the 
peculiar ways that repetitions do: it is the 
same thing happening, yet utterly different 
because it is a repeat.  Where Husserlian 
variation freely plays with an example so as 
to draw out neighbouring but different 
possibilities, in Bergson’s intuition we are 
given a field of variation in which different 
things show an affinity in virtue of repeating 
a common generative point.  Manuel 
Delanda’s Deleuze calls this a singularity, 
and this is what the scientists Full, Farley 
and Thelen are noticing: Bergson notes that 
octopus and human eyes in their similarity 
are utterly different yet point back to a 
common generative procedure that does not 
exist independently of evolving eyes (beat 
matter with sunlight for millions of years 
and you get eyes); likewise Full and Farley 
notice that biped and quadruped legs point 
back to a common generative procedure in 
virtue of which very different leggy bodies 
have an affinity (have motile creatures run 
into hurdles and eventually you get legs to 
hurdle over them).  For Bergson the 
differential, variational process that enables 
concepts and intuition is also the 
differential, variational process of life.  For 
Bergson, concepts are a kind of reasoning in 
things, a reasoning in life, and this reasoning 
in life is what we have been calling sense.   
This sort of differential process is at 
work in the reasoning that Peirce calls 
abduction.  Peirce on abduction is even more 
thorny than Husserl on variation; both 
philosophers have the characteristic of 
writing the same blessed book over and over 
again—repeating the same idea—so with 
neither is there an authoritative text; and, as 
with variation, abduction is so central it is 
hard to get it square in view, although Peirce 
does have texts that focus on it.49  To pierce 
to the quick, here are some of the things 
Peirce says:  1) Abduction is a procedure of 
rational inquiry.  2) It is a kind of inference 
that is insightful. 3) Abduction is neither 
deduction nor induction. 4) In contrast to 
deduction or induction, abduction adds 
something new to thought, namely 
hypotheses—and “hypothesis” is Peirce’s 
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 other name for abduction.  As Peirce puts it, 
“the essence of an induction is that it infers 
from one set of facts to another set of similar 
facts, whereas hypothesis infers from facts 
of one kind to facts of another.” (2.642)50  
Peirce’s repeated example is of beans in a 
bag.  From the fact that all the beans in the 
blue bag are white, and that this handful of 
beans is from the blue bag, we can deduce 
that the beans in this handful are white; the 
deduction is certain because it adds nothing 
new to the facts, just puts them a different 
way.  If it is the case that beans taken from 
the blue bag keep turning up white, we 
conclude by induction that all beans in the 
blue bag are white.  Here too the induction 
does not give us a new sort of fact, for it 
quantifies in a probabilistic way over facts 
already given about colours of beans in a 
bag.  Abduction is different: it starts from 
the facts that one of the bags of beans in the 
room, say the blue bag, contains only white 
beans, and that this handful of beans, which 
was taken from a single bag, contains all 
white beans; the inference by abduction is 
that this handful of beans is from the blue 
bag.  Put another way, in its context, this 
hypothesis is the best possible explanation 
for the fact the beans are white in colour.  
Notice that the abduction yields another kind 
of fact: from facts about colours of beans, to 
a hypothesis about which bag the beans are 
from.  Sherlock Holmes uses abductive 
reasoning all the time, which is what 
astonishes Watson: it is not surprising that 
someone studying the colour of swans might 
claim all swans are white, but it is surprising 
that someone given facts about dogs not 
barking in the night can confidently claim 
that so and so is the culprit. The 1940 
version of Gaslight invites mere induction, 
which is why it is such a miserable film, 
whereas Cukor’s 1944 version demands 
abduction of us and of Paula: what if 
Gregory isn’t the swanky swain he appears 
to be, but a swine? Would that explain 
things? 
We can now draw out a differential-
variation structure underlying abductive 
reasoning processes.  Here is a true story; 
put yourself in it.  In class a student is 
friendly with you, but in the coffee shop the 
same student repeatedly does not recognize 
you at all; your greeting gestures go right 
through him and you feel a fool.  This is, as 
Peirce, would put it, a surprising fact. 
Eventually, abduction strikes: “If the student 
has a twin, all is explained!”  The facts are 
no longer surprising.  In your abduction, 
remarking unique difference (“It’s not one 
student, but two!”) is inseparable from 
linking that unique difference to its singular 
generative point (“They’re twinned from 
birth!”).  That is, the appearance or 
expansion of a field of variation is 
coincident with the appearance of a concept 
that links variations as appearing within one 
field.  Singular elements already apparent in 
the experiential field all of a sudden stand 
out as in fact being variations in virtue of 
expressing a concept that for the first time 
grasps them as variations.  (Compare Paula 
grasping that the dimming of the gaslight 
and the lost jewellery are in fact events 
‘twinned from birth’.)  Contrast this with 
Husserl, in which conscious free variation 
plays new variants from an example via an 
existing link, and thence adds them to the 
field.  In the sort of variation we are 
studying here, which is here dubbed 
abductive-intensive variation, variation 
arises by a sort of twist from within, in 
which a novel grasp of the variation as 
variation is simultaneous with a novel grasp 
of the concept that links the variations as 
constituting a variational field.  This twist is 
sense. Now in the case of the twins, we are 
not formulating an utterly novel concept; 
what is novel is grasping that the concept 
“twinning” is expressed in (it now turns out) 
these twins.  But consider how the world 
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 around us, when we investigate it, constantly 
twins, manifests abductive-intensive 
variation.  As Darwin puts it: “How 
inexplicable is the similar pattern of the 
hand of a man, the foot of a dog, the wing of 
a bat, the flipper of a seal, on the doctrine of 
independent acts of creation! how simply 
explained on the principle of the natural 
selection of successive slight variations in 
the diverging descendants from a single 
progenitor!”51  
In his book Mind and Nature: A 
Necessary Unity, Gregory Bateson makes 
some insightful yet maddeningly obscure 
remarks about this abductive aspect of 
nature.  He begins with the remark that: “We 
are so accustomed to the universe in which 
we live and to our puny methods of thinking 
about it that we can hardly see that it is, for 
example, surprising that abduction is 
possible.”52  Why is it that concepts that 
apply in one case apply in another, that the 
anatomy of a seal flipper is echoed in some 
other thing?  On the one hand, the 
possibility of abduction is a liability, for it 
reinforces prejudiced patterning; the fact 
that we can map both gender roles and 
sexual biology using the concept of activity 
vs. passivity leads to bad social and 
biological concepts that are hard to shake, 
precisely because they are mutually 
reinforcing.  But, on the other hand, as 
Bateson puts it, “all thought would be totally 
impossible in a universe in which abduction 
was not expectable.”53  In other words, if 
concepts are not items given, but a process 
of reasoning in things, reasoning in life; and 
if concepts express abductive-intensive 
variation, the encounter of remarkably 
different variants that are nonetheless 
repeats of a pattern; then concepts are only 
possible if nature is expectably abductive.   
What does this mean? Bateson writes 
“that there are, in nature and 
correspondingly reflected in our processes 
of thought, great regions within which 
abductive systems obtain. For example, the 
anatomy and physiology of the body can be 
considered as one vast abductive system 
with its own coherence within itself at any 
given time.”54  There is something 
obviously right about this.  Much as students 
may be twinned, one’s hands have 
irreducibly different senses, yet point back 
in that very difference to a singular origin; 
and one’s heart and liver likewise are 
twinned in a different way.55  If this were 
not the case, then one’s body could not be 
the sort of centre of action that it is; further, 
if one’s hands did not prolong into a 
universe that twinned out like one’s body 
does, then there would be no possibility of 
bodily action.  What is here called twinning 
is as it were the condition through which 
alone dynamic schema, concepts and sense 
are possible.  
And so from variation, through 
intuition and abduction, we are led round by 
a different route to Bergson’s point about 
creative evolution.  If philosophy can begin 
with singularity and arrive at concepts, or 
rather create concepts that grasp the 
singular, it is because nature has already 
made this sort of movement between the 
singular and the conceptual, or rather it is 
because nature is this movement of 
abduction, in which singular beginnings 
twin, repeat, spread out and vary in ways 
that point back to singularity, thus 
manifesting the structure of invariance in 
variance that is called concept.  
Reductionism, reducing nature to a roster of 
already given, extensively variant elements 
is misguided. If scientific and philosophical 
method and thinking are possible, it is 
because nature is abductive, because nature 
has inflated itself as conceptual, because 
nature has a sense.  To do philosophy we 
need a philosophy of nature that does not 
seek to reduce nature to what is most 
thinkable for us, with our practical 
prejudices; we need to grasp nature as 
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 abducting itself into what is thinkable in 
itself.  And abduction will not be the 
expansion of a formula already packed into 
a beginning point, but the coming into being 
of new, radical differences that at once point 
back to—or perhaps we should say 
express—a singular conceptual origin, a 
sense.  
                                                          
                                                                                       
du comportement (Paris: Quadrige/Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1942), e.g. it is 
central to his discussion of the human order. 
4 See the “Introduction to Metaphysics,” in 
Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: An 
Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Mabelle 
L. Andison (New York: Citadel Press, 
2002); for the French, see Henri Bergson, 
Édition du Centenaire (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, Oeuvres), pp. 
1392-1432.  Because the ambition of 
philosophy is to gain an intuition that would 
connect us with the inner mobility of things, 
“Metaphysics is therefore the science which 
claims to dispense with symbols” (162, 1396 
in the French; Bergson’s emphasis).  In 
Bergson’s usage, concepts are the fruit of 
analysis; they immobilise things and 
generalise, thereby betraying their object. In 
this paper a different usage of concept is 
developed.  
1 This paper was provoked by late night 
discussions of Bergsonian and Husserlian 
method with Rocco Gangle, Heath Massey, 
and Joshua Ramey, at the Collegium 
Phaenomenologicum XXVI: Thinking 
through the Difference between Immanence 
and Transcendence: Levinas, Bergson, and 
Deleuze.  My thanks to them for their 
provocations, and to Leonard Lawlor for 
setting up the context in which such 
discussions were possible. An earlier version 
of this paper was presented at Bergson in 
Context, the annual conference of the British 
Society for Phenomenology, March 2003, 
St. Hilda’s College. I would like to thank 
members of the audience for their questions, 
and especially John Mullarkey and 
Valentine Moulard for their astute 
criticisms. 
5 This is point about intuition is apparent in 
Emmanuel Levinas, The Theory of Intuition 
in Husserl's Phenomenology, trans. André 
Orianne, second ed. (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1995), esp. 
at the end of chapter 6 and in the final 
chapter; the point also surely anticipates 
Levinas’s later emphasis on a non-relational 
relation to the Other.  My thanks to the 
anonymous reviewer of this paper for 
pointing out the connection between Levinas 
and Bergson. 
6 See “Violence and Metaphysics” in 
Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, 
trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978) and Jacques Derrida, 
Speech and Phenomena, trans. David B. 
Allison (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 1973).  For a detailed 
study of this issue and its relevance to 
French philosophy, see Leonard Lawlor, 
Thinking Through French Philosophy: The 
Being of the Question (Bloomington & 
2 For this concept of distance, see Renaud 
Barbaras, "Life and Perceptual 
Intentionality," Research in Phenomenology 
33 (2003) and Renaud Barbaras, Le désir et 
la distance: Introduction à une 
phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: J. 
Vrin, 1999). 
3 See especially Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin 
Smith (New Jersey: The Humanities Press, 
1962); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: 
Galimard, 1945).  But the special role of 
language is already apparent in Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, 
trans. Alden L. Fisher (London: Methuen, 
1965); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La structure 
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Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
2003), esp. chapter 2, and Leonard Lawlor, 
Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of 
Phenomenology (Bloomington & 
Indianpolis: Indiana University Press, 2002), 
esp. part three. 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University 
Press, 1970). 
11 For a survey of the issue, see Jean Petitot 
et al., eds., Naturalizing Phenomenology: 
Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and 
Cognitive Science (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999). This collection 
includes Barbaras’s “The Movement of the 
Living as the Originary Foundation of 
Perceptual Intentionality,” which contests 
the effort to reduce phenomena to the nature 
of the usual scientific tradition. 
7 This position is already evident in Martin 
Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1962); Martin 
Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max 
Niemeyer Verlag, 1963).  It becomes ever 
more apparent in the increasing emphasis on 
language in his later work.  
12 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 
trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: 
Macmillan Education, 1929), and Immanuel 
Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner 
Pluhar (Indiana: Hackett, 1987), esp. the 
dialectic of teleological judgement and §77 
therein. 
8 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible 
and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1968); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le 
visible et l'invisible (Paris: Galimard, 1979).  
In Merleau-Ponty’s earliest monograph 
(Merleau-Ponty, La structure du 
comportement ) he cites with approval Hegel 
(via Jean Hyppolite) on “the hidden mind of 
nature.”  If in his later thinking Heidegger’s 
influence turns Merleau-Ponty to finding a 
sense, a logos, already at work in being, for 
Merleau-Ponty this would also have to be a 
sense of the being of nature. As is well 
known, Merleau-Ponty can never tear 
himself away nature; he is entranced by the 
organization of natural bodies and 
behaviours as anticipating symbol and logos. 
(See e.g., Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ***check 
La nature: notes, cours du Collége de 
France, Traces écrites (Paris: Seuil, 1995).) 
13 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 
trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1991) and Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische 
meditationen und Pariser vortrage (Haag: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), hereinafter CM, 
with references by section number and page 
# in the German; these page #s are also 
given in the margin of the English edition. 
Compare Edmund Husserl, Formal and 
Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978) and 
Edmund Husserl, Formale und 
transzendentale logik (Den Haag: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1974), hereinafter FTL, with 
references by section number and the page # 
given in the margins in both the German and 
English editions: “…absolutely everything 
of which an Ego can think is related to [the 
Ego’s] life of consciousness.”  (FTL §97, 
216)   
14 On this issue, also cf. CM §28, 97.  
Scholars of sense in Merleau-Ponty should 
take note of this remark. 
9 Husserl’s division is nicely elucidated in 
Joseph J. Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's 
Phenomenology (West Lafayette, Indiana: 
Purdue University Press, 1994), and 
Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's 
Phenomenology .  
10 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the 
European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, trans. David Carr 
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an intuited individual as such indicates a 
central point: it is the process of variation, as 
driven by consciousness, not singulars, that 
are at the heart of Husserl’s account.  
Bergson diverges from Husserl because for 
Bergson variation will come back to a 
movement within the singular thing itself.  
For Husserl, philosophy cannot be driven by 
singulars, and this point is at the crux of 
Husserl’s emphasis on an absolute division 
between natural science and philosophy. In 
contrast, the task of Bergsonian philosophy 
is to descend to the singular, and so Bergson 
opens a possibility of drawing science and 
philosophy closer together.  This difference 
is vital to Deleuze’s appropriation of 
Bergson for a transcendental empiricism (vs. 
a Husserlian transcendental 
phenomenology). 
15 As Levinas puts it in his important study 
of Husserlian intuition, for Husserl essences 
are inexact and are not to be confused with 
Platonic essences.  Essences arise from 
ideation, not idealization, and thus (Levinas 
suggests) would not fall to Bergson’s 
criticism that essences falsify the meaning of 
concrete reality. (Levinas, The Theory of 
Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology , 
chap. 6, esp. pp. 115-119.)  Levinas’s point 
about ideation cannot be disentangled from 
his insistence that the distinctive character of 
Husserlian intuition is that its object is 
“given in person,” and that Husserlian 
consciousness is already open to the 
presence of the world.  So the object of an 
essence has an intimate role in the intuition 
of essence.   
Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's 
Phenomenology likewise argues that for 
Husserl essences are not Platonic because 
they are given in an intuition that links 
consciousness to its object.  Put even more 
emphatically, for Husserl the intuition of 
essences depends on singular objects that 
stand as exemplars, as shown in Burt C. 
Hopkins, "Phenomenological Cognition of 
the A Priori: Husserl's Method of "Seeing 
Essences" (Wesenserschauung)," in Husserl 
in Contemporary Context: Prospects and 
Projects for Phenomenology, ed. Burt C. 
Hopkins (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997). But 
Hopkins—who unlike Levinas and 
Kockelmans is at ease equating Husserl’s 
eidos with Plato’s idea—also rightly notes 
that for Husserl such an exemplary singular 
“is not in the proper sense an intuited 
individuum as such” (p. 165; Hopkins is 
here quoting from Husserl’s Experience and 
Judgment).  On the one hand, Husserl’s 
insistence that we arrive at essences and 
categories through intuitions enables the 
connection drawn below to Bergson on 
singulars.  On the other hand, Hopkins’s 
point that in such intuitions the object is not 
On the issue of variation in Husserl and 
in science, also see Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone, The Primacy of Movement 
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company, 1999), esp. chapter 4.  
16 Barbaras, "Life and Perceptual 
Intentionality,"  and Barbaras, Le désir et la 
distance: Introduction à une 
phénoménologie de la perception. 
17 For this point in Hegel, cf. G.W.F. Hegel, 
Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).  
On this issue, it is also worth referring to the 
discussion of the problem of the given in 
John McDowell, Mind and World 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), which is in some way inspired 
by Hegel.  
18 We need to reconstruct this sense, 
according to Husserl, because the 
universality that belongs to general thought 
is the telos of logical activity and philosophy 
and is not to be found in rules of experience. 
On this point, see Edmund Husserl, 
Experience and Judgment: Investigations in 
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a Genealogy of Logic, trans. James S. 
Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973) and 
Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und urteil: 
unterzuchungen zur gealogie der logik 
(Hamburg: Claasen verlag, 1964), 
hereinafter EJ, with references to section 
number, page # in the English edition, page 
# in the German: EJ §80, 319, 384.  
points out that Levin is muting Husserl’s 
sharp distinction (emphasized by Levinas in 
his study of intuition, see note 33; also see 
Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's 
Phenomenology and Klaus Held, "Husserl's 
Phenomenological Method," in The New 
Husserl: A Critical Reader, ed. Donn 
Welton (Bloomington & Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2003)) between a 
priori and empirical sciences, and is also 
muting the difference between free variation 
and alteration (see note 48), which 
difference is key to Wesensschau.  On the 
other hand, Husserl’s commitment to 
intuition of essences does put intuition of 
essences proper and thence eidetic variation 
into continuity with other sorts of intuitions 
(such as might lead to induction), which 
again is why it is possible to draw 
connections between Husserl and Bergson, 
yet contrast them.  The key difference, as 
argued below, is that in Husserl 
consciousness drives variation, whereas for 
Bergson intuition opens us to variation 
within singulars themselves (cf. note 15). 
For more on the relation between induction 
and Wesensschau, see the discussion below 
on the different levels of generality and 
universality in Husserl.  Elisabeth Ströker, 
The Husserlian Foundations of Science 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997) should especially 
be consulted on the matter of Husserl and 
science; chapter II of this work, esp. pp 71-
73, begins to problematize variation in a 
discussions of problems concerning 
evidence of essences, i.e., the theme of 
Wessensschau.  
Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's 
Phenomenology, chapter five, gives a 
compact and masterful synopsis of the 
theme of variation as part of a survey of 
Husserl.  Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in 
Husserl's Phenomenology is another 
important monograph that takes up variation 
amongst other themes. Hopkins, 
"Phenomenological Cognition of the A 
19 The connection between intuition in 
Bergson and in Kant is suggested by Nathan 
Rotenstreich, "Bergson and the 
Transformation of the Notion of Intuition," 
Journal  of the History of Philosophy 10 
(1972); the approach here is from a direction 
different than Rotenstreich’s, since it takes 
bearings from Hegel’s critical relation to 
Kant. 
20 Cf. Richard M. Zaner, "Examples and 
Possibles: A Criticism of Husserl's Theory 
of Free-Phantasy Variation," Research in 
Phenomenology 3 (1973), which remarks the 
peculiar tension between the centrality of 
variation and the lack of thematic 
discussions of it.  Zaner’s remark, though 
part of an earlier phase of Husserl research, 
remains true.  Research into the literature 
reveals that variation is a topic that comes 
up in discussions of Husserl, but hardly ever 
gets thematic or extended treatment, e.g., it 
only rarely appears in article or chapter titles 
or as a keyword in abstracts or indices.  
More important, variation is not treated as a 
problem.  While the topic of variation comes 
up, especially in discussions of Wesensschau 
(since free variation is crucial to insights 
into essences), the question how variation is 
possible does not seem to arise.  
Zaner’s article criticises the account of 
variation in David Michael Levin, 
"Induction and Husserl's Theory of Eidetic 
Variation," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 29 (1968), 
which argues that eidetic variation is 
continuous with induction. Zaner rightly 
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Priori: Husserl's Method of "Seeing 
Essences" (Wesenserschauung)," gives a 
relatively extended treatment of the theme of 
variation, which is also discussed in Held, 
"Husserl's Phenomenological Method."   
"Phenomenological Cognition of the A 
Priori: Husserl's Method of "Seeing 
Essences" (Wesenserschauung)," and 
Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's 
Phenomenology.  
Further writings that focus on 
variation, are Nebojsa Kujundzic, "Thought 
Experiments: Architecture and Economy of 
Thought," Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology 26 (1995), which draws a 
link between Husserl and Mach on variation; 
and Sheets-Johnstone, The Primacy of 
Movement, esp. chapter 4. 
28 On Husserl’s divergence from traditional 
empiricist appeal to abstraction, cf. Hopkins, 
"Phenomenological Cognition of the A 
Priori: Husserl's Method of "Seeing 
Essences" (Wesenserschauung)."  
29 “[T]he variation of the necessary initial 
example is the performance in which the 
“eidos” should emerge and by means of 
which the evidence of the indissoluble 
eidetic correlation between constitution and 
constituted should also emerge” (FTL §98, 
219, emphasis mine). Husserl says this of 
eidetic variation, but other sorts of 
generals/universals would also be manifest 
in the performance of variation. 
21 See note 13 for details of the convention 
for citing FTL. 
22 See note 18 for details of the convention 
for citing EJ. 
23 Transcription by author from DVD 
edition, Warner Home Video, 2004. 
24 The account of structure of universal 
judgements given here is extracted from EJ 
§87 ff. 
30 For support of this view of Darwin, see 
Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure of 
Evolutionary Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2002). 
25 Strictly speaking we should distinguish 
judgements of generals (which hold of 
multiple instances) and judgements of 
universals (which holds of all instances). 
But this distinction is not quite thematic in 
the materials under discussion, and so the 
distinction will be blurred in the treatment 
given here. This does not have an impact on 
the point being made, which concerns the 
structure of judgements of both generality 
and universality.   
31 Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and 
Virtual Philosophy (London: Continuum, 
2002). 
32 Levinas remarks that Husserl’s own 
writing leads to questions about how we are 
to distinguish between different levels of 
generality (Levinas, The Theory of Intuition 
in Husserl's Phenomenology , pp. 107-9).  
The suggestion made here is that the 
difference is not so much in the structure of 
the ideas as in the process of variation.  
Hopkins, "Phenomenological Cognition of 
the A Priori: Husserl's Method of "Seeing 
Essences" (Wesenserschauung)," gives a 
fine grained analysis of the difference 
between levels, without yet taking up 
variation as a problem. 
26 The quote from which this material is 
taken in fact specifies the conditions in 
which this universal essence would be an 
ideal.  But any structure of empirical 
generalities would also have this form in 
Husserl—empirical generalities are just 
detected in a different sort of variation.  
27 The interpretation of judgement and 
variation in Husserl given here is in its broad 
outlines confirmed by Hopkins, 
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plays on a logic of essence, whereas a logic 
of concept is what is needed; the working of 
a language’s grammar is not viewed as a 
hidden institution behind the scenes, which 
is why grammar is not a mystery (see the 
discussion of grammar below), but the 
workings of Borges lottery keep receding 
behind the visible even whilst being 
identical with the visible as its reflection.  
33 It is must be emphasized that for Husserl 
there is an crucial difference between such 
philosophical ideas and ideas arrived at by 
induction, and this is why for Husserl there 
is a tension between a science of nature and 
a science of experience.  On this tension, see 
Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's 
Phenomenology , chapters 4-6 and esp. pp. 
112-116; also see notes 15 and 20 above. 
36 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is 
philosophy?, trans. Hugh  Tomlinson and 
Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994). 
34 G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. 
A.V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press International, 1969). 
35 The suggestion being made here is that 
perhaps the Merleau-Ponteian theme of 
institution (see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
L'institution dans l'histoire personnelle et 
publique: le probléme de la passivité, le 
sommeil, l'inconscient, la mémoire: notes de 
cours au Collége de France, 1954-1955 
(Paris: Belin, 2003)), which is related to the 
theme of sense, might be understood in 
terms of the implication of the visible and 
the invisible that we find in Hegel’s concept, 
which term Hyppolite translates as “sense” 
(see note 37). The connection drawn 
between Hegel’s concept and Merleau-
Ponty’s theme of the entwining of the 
visible and the invisible is warranted by 
Hegel’s constant play, in his analysis of 
essence, on the word Schein—which is 
played out as show, appearance, the shining 
forth of essence. Hegel’s problem with the 
logic of essence, as noted above, is that it 
involves terms that either show up or do not, 
and that it cannot grasp the relation between 
what shows and what is being shown.  The 
logic of institution—which is what we find 
in the concept that mediates its own 
instituion—is precisely the logic of 
something making itself visible for the first 
time, of an invisible institution that needs its 
visible to be what it is.  Borges’s lottery of 
Babylon appears enigmatic as institution 
precisely because Borges’s articulation of it 
37 See Leonard Lawlor, "The End of 
Phenomenology: Expressionism in Deleuze 
and Merleau-Ponty," Continental 
Philosophy Review 31 (1998) and the 
editorial introduction and Deleuze’s review 
of Logique et existence in Jean Hyppolite, 
Logic and Existence, trans. Leonard Lawlor 
and Amit Sen (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1997). 
38 This essay cannot provide the argument 
that Hegelian concept is already sense, but 
likely it is. 
39 Strikingly, Robert Rosen’s argument for a 
new scientific formalism for biology 
repeatedly criticizes traditional scientific 
formalism for reducing everything to syntax; 
he argues for a reciprocal relation between 
syntax and semantics (Robert Rosen, Life 
itself : a comprehensive inquiry into the 
nature, origin, and fabrication of life, 
Complexity in ecological systems series 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 
1991)). 
40 The reference here is to Bergson’s essay 
“Intellectual Effort,” in Henri Bergson, 
Mind-energy: Lectures and Essays, trans. H. 
Wildon Carr (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
Press, 1975). Leonard Lawlor, The 
Challenge of Bergsonism (London: 
Continuum, 2003), pp 70-79 explores 
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of Martin Heidegger?” (Levinas, The Theory 
of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, p. 
119).  For this sort of point in Heidegger, 
see, e.g., Being and Time, where he writes of 
“being-in” that “we cannot indeed consent to 
nullify the primordial character of this 
phenomenon by deriving it from others—
that is to say by an inappropriate analysis, in 
the sense of a dissolving or breaking up.”  
(Heidegger, Being and Time, §28, p. 131 in 
the German.)  Analysis cannot proceed from 
theoretical contemplation, and Heidegger’s 
criticism of Husserl would be that despite 
Husserl’s beginning in variation, so long as 
consciousness is driving the variation, 
Husserlian variation is an analysis that starts 
from the wrong point.  
Bergon’s essay and dynamic schema in 
detail, and draws a connection to the theme 
of sense; the connection is arguably resonant 
with the account of sense suggested here.  
41 Robert J. Full and Claire T. Farley, 
"Musculoskeletal Dynamics in Rhythmic 
Systems: A Comparative Approach to 
Legged Locomotion," in Biomechanics and 
Neural Control of Posture and Movement, 
ed. Jack M. Winters and Patrick E. Crago 
(New York: Springer Verlag, 2000). On this 
sort of issue about the organism, also see 
Gerald L. Geison and Manfred D. 
Laubichler, "The Varied Lives of 
Organisms: Variation in the Historiography 
of the Biological Sciences," Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Biological and 
Biomedical Sciences 32, no. 1 (2001) and 
Manfred D. Laubichler, "The Organism is 
Dead. Long Live the Organism," 
Perspectives on Science 8, no. 3 (2000). 
45 See the preface to Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception. 
46 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. 
Arthur Mitchell (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover, 
1998), p xiii. 42 Michael H. Dickinson et al., "How 
Animals Move: An Integrative View," 
Science 288 (2000). 
47 This ambiguity could also be tracked by 
looking at Bergson’s discussion in Matter 
and Memory of the quality of the colour red 
vs. the quantification of it as light with 
frequency X, taking some guidance from 
Deleuze’s comments in Gilles Deleuze, 
Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Barbara Habberjam (New York, N. Y.: Zone 
Books, 1988).  The ambiguity here is that 
the body, as just mentioned, serves to 
contract one order of time into another, yet 
belongs to both. 
48 On alteration vs. variation, cf. 
Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's 
Phenomenology , 141. Also see Thomas M. 
Seebohm, "Individuals, Identity, Names: 
Phenomenological Considerations," in 
Husserl in Contemporary Context: 
Prospects and Projects for Phenomenology, 
ed. Burt C. Hopkins (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1997), 141-142, which makes the point that 
the variation that gives empirical universals 
43 Esther Thelen, "Motor Development: A 
New Synthesis," American Psychologist 50, 
no. 2 (1995), Esther Thelen and L.B. Smith, 
A Dynamic Systems Approach to the 
Development of Cognition and Action, ed. 
Stephen Palmer, MIT Press/Bradford Books 
Series in Cognitive Psychology (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books, 1994). 
44 What is at stake here and in Merleau-
Ponty is well captured in Levinas’s 
insightful analysis of the tension between 
Husserl the intellectualist philosopher and 
Husserl the phenomenologist who turns us 
to life. Levinas’s analysis culminates in the 
questions at the end of his chapter on the 
intuition of essences: “Is our main attitude 
toward reality that of theoretical 
contemplation? Is not the world presented in 
its very being as a center of action, as a field 
of activity or of care—to speak the language 
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“is not “free” variation” since the former has 
not yet prescinded from predicates, i.e., un-
free variation is a bit too much like 
alteration; Seebohm’s point about free 
variation is related to our point about 
intensive variation.  
practice, the first number in the reference is 
the volume number, and the number after 
the decimal point is the paragraph number in 
that volume. 
51 Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals 
and Plants Under Domestication, 2 vols., 
vol. 1 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998), p. 12. 
49 Douglas R. Anderson, "The Evolution of 
Peirce's Concept of Abduction," 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society 22 (1986) gives a clear overview of 
abduction in Peirce, and his position is 
compelling.  Also see C.J. Misak, Truth and 
the End of Inquiry (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1991). 
52 Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: A 
Necessary Unity (New York: E.P. Dutton, 
1979), p 142. 
53 Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary 
Unity, p 143. 
54 Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary 
Unity, p 143. 
50 “Deduction, Induction, Hypothesis” in 
Charles S. Peirce, Collected Papers of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 1/2 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1960); as per established 
55 Cf. John Russon, The Self and its Body in 
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (Toronto: 
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